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[So F. No. 17042. In Bank. Feb. 1, 1946.] 
ANNA RIVIECCIO, Respondent, v. EDNA BOTHAN, 
Appellant. 
[1] 
. ~ 
Divorce-Judg!b.ent-:-Relief from Fraudulent Deeree.-In an 
action for equitable ~lief from a divorce decree, a finding that 
the plaintiff in the divorce action in giving a fictitious address 
of the defendant did so .. with the fraudulent intent of with-
holding from the latter n~tice:"f the proceedings was justified 
by evidence of plaintiff's familiarity with the streets in the 
city in question. his knowledge of the defendant's place of 
residence and his addre~sin!l' letters so that thev reached the 
defendant. . 
[2] Judgments-Equitable Relief-Fraud.-A willful misstatement 
of the defendant's address in an affidavit for publication of 
summons is extrinsic fraud justifying setting aside the judg-
ment resulting from proceedinl!S of which the defendant had 
no notice 
[3] Dlvorce-Judgment-Relief from Fraudulent Decree.-Under 
a court's power to purge its records of a judgment procured 
by e:ztrinsieally fraudulent acts, it may set aside a divorce 
decree 80 procured although one of the spouses has died and 
there is not involved any property right in which the 8lll'Vivor 
is beneficially interested. In any ease, a property right is in-
volved where the deceased spouse was killed in circumstances 
justifying an award under thE' law as to workmen's comll8n-
sation. 
[4] Id.-Judgment - Relief from Fraudulent Decrees-Laches.-
In a wife's action for equitable relief from a fraudulent divorce 
decree, a finding against her laches is supported by evidence 
as to her being lulled into a belief that the husband was still 
a devoted husband, that she lost trace of him hut constantly 
inquired as to his whereabouts, that she continued to write 
to him at addresses known to her, many miles distant. and 
that she was in i11 health much of the time. 
[6] megitimacy-Issue of Void Marriap.-A decree setting aside 
a fraudulent divoreE' decre(' does not bastardizE' a child of the 
[6] What constitutes a marriage within a legitimation statute, 
note, 84 AL.B. 499. See, also, 18 Oal.Jur. 922; 7 Am.Jm. 829. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1, S, 4, '7,] Divorce and Separation, 
§l27(S); [2) Judgments, § 251(8); [6] Dlegitimacy, 16; [6] 
Wormen's Compensation, § 49; [8] Workmen'. Compensation, 160. 
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divorced husband born aftpT the divorce and before his mar-
riage to the mother. 
[6] Workmen's Oompensation-Dependents-Ohildren.-The rights 
of a child born after a father's fraudulent procurement of a 
divorce and before his: marriage to the mother include any 
rights of 8: legitima, child in death beneflts ~antpd nndpT the 
Workmen's Corn~n!'ation Law 
[7] Divorce - Jud~nt - Relief from Fraudulent Decrees-Par-
ties.-In an action to set aside a fraudulently procured divorce 
decree, a child born to the f<h-mer husband after the divorce 
and prior to his marriage t~ the mother is not an indispensable 
party, since the ahild is legitimate and possesses all the rights 
of a legitimate to death benefits awardable under the Work-
men's Compensation Law. 
[8] Workmen's Oompensation - Dependents - Wife.-A share of 
the death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law 
may be made to a woman married to a man after his fraudu-
lent procurement of a divorce, irrespective of the validity of 
her marriage, on a determination that she was dependent for 
her support on decedent and in good faith lived in his house-
hold as his wife. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the· 
City and County of San Francisco. Robert L. McWilliams, 
Judge. Aftirmed. 
Action for declaratory relief and to have a decree of divorce 
set aside. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Lemuel Dalton Sanderson for Appellant. 
Leon Prescott and Charles Bagby for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Giovanni Rivieccio died on December 23, 
1940, in Oakland from injuries receiyed in an accident while : 
driving a truck of his employer. Plaintiff contends that she I 
is his widow and in thiR action for declaratory relief praYll 1 that a final decree of diverce entered in his favor of th~Ji 
Superior Court of San Francisco be set aside. ;1 
The decedent married plaintiff in Quincy, Massachusetts.':j 
on August 6, 1924. They lived together, first in Quincy and·, 
later in Italy. In March. 1928, plaintiff returned to Quincy} 
with the consent of her husband. He stayed in Italy because! 
he dill not have a permit to reenter the United St..'\tes. It wasJ 
agreed, however, that he would join her as soon as po88l"ble.'! 
.4 :, 
! 
/ 
-. "'\ 
) 
) 
) 
) 
/ 
/ 
Feb. 1946] RIVIECCJO v. BOTHAN 
[27 C.2d 621; 165 P.2d 617) 
623 
He went from Italy to Australia and, between 1928 and 1935, 
worked as a steward on ships operating between Sydney and 
San Francisco. At Sydpey he met defendant and became the 
father of a child borp t'o her in 1930. On December 19. 1932. 
he filed an action /tJf divorce against plaintiff in the Superior 
Court of San Francisco. Summons was served by puhlil"ation 
and mail, based on Rivieccio's affidavit that "th(> last known 
place of residence of defElll~ant was an(l is Hancock and 
Water Streets. Quincy. M~ssachusctts." On th(> elate that 
the order for publication was made. Rivieccio's attorney 
mailed a copy of the ~ummons and comnlaint to .. Annn Zac-
cordelli Rivieccio ... at Hancock Ilnd Water !=!trep,ts. Quincy, 
Mas..c:;achusetts." Rivieccio also stnteo in his affioavit that 
he believed he had u good CflllS(, of action and incorporated his 
verified complaint in hi" Ilffidavit. The complaint alleged: 
"That plaintiff ar.d defend:lIIt senarllted from each other on 
or about the 14th day of May. 1927. when ~he d(>.c:;erte(l him. 
• • . That heret(Jfore. t.o wit. more t.han one year last past im-
mediately prior to the commencement of thif/ RCtion. (lefend-
ant wi11fully deserted and abandone(l nlaint.iff. by voluntarily 
separatinl? herself from pJaintiff with the intention of desert-
ing' and abandoninl? him. al?RinRt his will an(l consent. 1'hat 
said desertion now cont.inue.c: Rno has unint.errnpt.edly con-
tinued for morp than one :veal' last paRt immeoiatelv prior to 
the commencement of this action against his will an(l consent!' 
There was no appearance on behlllf of the wife. an(l on 
April 5, 1933. Rivieecio was granted an interloC'utory decree. 
The final decree was entered on Anril 10. 1934. On Septem-
ber 17. ]934. Rivieccio marrif'd defendant in Australia. and 
two months later he therE' adonte(l th(> ('hiM horn hf'Tore the 
marriage. Shortly thereaft.er t.hey 1111 carne t.o San Francisco 
where they lived t.o(!ether unt.il (le('e(lf'nt.'s de.ath. The t.rial 
court annulled the divorcf' decree and declared that plaintiff is 
the survivinl? widow of Giovanni Rivieccio. Defendant ap-
peals. 
The trial court found: "That the affidavit for publication of 
summons filed by Giovanni Riyieccio ..• was a fraud upon 
this plaintiff and upon t.he Raid Superior Court. and that the 
Decree of Divorce . . . was obtained by meant'! of fraud on 
said Court and upon the plaintiff .... That plaintiff herein 
never deserted decedent and that the allegation in !mid com-
plaint for divorce that plaintiff herein hM deserted decedent 
on or about May 14, 1927 ••• is not true, and was and is 
/ 
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wholly and willfully false, and was known to decedent to be 
false and fraudulent when made by him. That said allegation 
of desertion ... is wholly inconsistent with the various let· 
ters written by decedent to plaintiff from December, 1928. to ' 
September 30. 1930 .... That Hanco<,k and Water Streets 
in the City of Quincy.-, M!?sHachusettR. are puhlic thorough. 
fare.~ and do not in~I"!'loict: that plaintiff herein never lived 
on either of said streets, and that both of said street!o1 are 10- ' 
cated at considerable dilltance from where plaintiff re!o1ided in 
said city. That said city of .. ~ncy. at the time plaintiff 
herein and decedent re..'1ided therein M husband and wife, had 
a population of approximately 44.000: that decedent had 
lived in, around and about said city for a considerable period 
of time and was familiar with the Rtreet.'1 and thoroughfares 
thereof. That at divers times after plaintiff herein returned 
to said Quincy. and at the time of the filing of decedent's 
complaint and affidavit for divorce and at the time of the 
entry of the Interlocutory and Final Decrees of Divorce. and 
for a considerable time thereafter, plaintiff and decedent were 
in written communication with each other. and that deceden~ 
knew where plaintiff re..'1ided and that decedent never ad~ 
dressed plaintiff at Hancock and Water Streets. Quincy;' 
Massachusetts. and plaintiff never received any correspon~i~ 
enca from any person addressed to her at Hancock a!¥l' 
Water, or Hancock and Water Streets. Quincy. Massach~~ 
setts " ' J'"'1 
• I~ [1] Defendant contends that the finding of ext~~ 
fraud, requisite to warrant an attack in equity on a fina): 
judgment, was not supported by the evidence. In the lig~f 
of the facts that Rivieccio was familiar was the streets of:. 
Quincy, Massachusetts. that he knew where plaintiff residectl 
and that until September. 1930. he addressed his letters .uri 
such a manner that they reached her, the trial court was justi.:' 
fied in finding that he gave the flctitiou!l addr~ with '~i; 
fraudulent intent of withholding from plaintiff notice of~J 
divorce proceedings. [I] It ill settled that a willful ~ 
statement of the defendant's address in an affidavit for pubU!\ 
cation of snmmon..'1 is extrimric fraud and justifles setting aSl~' 
the judgment resulting from proceedin~ of which defend .. : 
did not have notice. (Aldrich v. Aldrich, 203 Cal. 433.: : 
[264 P. 754]; Stern v. Judson. 163 Cal. 726. 735 [127 P. 38,' 
Doyle v. Hampton, 159 Cal. 729. 733 r116 P. 391: pars~ .. 
WeiI,l44 Cal. 410,419 [77 P.1007] i Dunlap v. Steere, 9~._,: . 
" 
,.~ 
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344, 347 [28 P. 563, 27 AmJ:'t.Uep. 143, 16 L.R.A. 361] j 
Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.App. 137, 142 [256 P. 484]; W~1liams v. 
Williams, 57 Cal.App. 36 [206 P. 650].) 
[3] Defendant contends that a Nuit in equity to set aside 
a divorce decree cannot be maintained after the death of one 
spouse unless it appears that the divorce decree or the sub-
sequent action to set' it aside involved some property right 
in which the su~ving spouse is beneficially interested. A 
court, however, has autHority to purge its own records and 
may set aside a judgment at any time when it appears that 
the court has been imposed. upon by extrinsically fraudulent 
acts. (McGuinness v. Superior GOU1·t, 196 Cal. 222, 234 [237 
P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110]; Tom~ v. Tomb, 120 Cal.App. 438, 
442 [7 P.2d 1104]; Britton v. Bryson, 216 Cal. 362, 369 [14 
P.2d 502); Aldrich v. Aldrich, supra, 437.) The court's power 
in this respect is not dependent on whether property rights 
are involved. (See Tomb v. Tomb, supra, at p. 442.) More-
over, a property interest is involved in this proceeding. Plain-
tiff's allegation that decedent was killed as the result of an 
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment 
is admitted by defendant. Claims for a death benefit may 
therefore he made under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
and in making its award the Industrial Accident Commission 
will take into consideration the marital relationship of the 
decedent to each of the parties herein. 
[4] Defendant also contends that plaintiff was not dili-
gent in discovering the fraud and that since the interests of 
defendant and her child have intervened, plaintiff should 
be barred from attacking the divorce decree. The existence 
of laches ill determined by the trial court in the light of the 
facts and circumstances of the particular case. (Austin v. 
Hallmark O~1 Co., 21 Ca1.2d 718, 734 [134 P.2d 777] j Fry 
v. Board of Ed1tcation, 17 Ca1.2d 753, 761 [112 P.2d 229].) 
The trial court in the present case found that "plaintiff herein 
is not, nor has she been, guilty of laches or any lack of dili-
gt'.nce in instituting the above entitled action." The record 
discloses ample evidence to support this finding. Plaintiff 
testified that before and after the divorce proceedings her 
husband lulled her into the belief that he was still a devoted 
husband, and that she later lost trace of him but constantly 
made inquiries of relatives and friends as to his whereabouts. 
She continued to write to her husband at the address known 
I 
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to her in Australia and one known to her in San Francisco, 
but received no response to her letters. She was separated 
by many miles from San Frabcisco and was in ill health from 
1:131 until 1937. (See AJdrich v. Aldrich, 203 Cal. 433, 437 
[264 P. 754].) 
[5] The judgment annulling the divorce decree will not 
make defendant's clilld illegitimate, nor will it necessarily 
entail for defendant the hardship that she envisages. The 
child will not be deprived of the status of a legitimate child 
of the decedent. Under section 85 of the Civil Code "The 
issue of a marriage which~ is void ... is legitimate" while 
under section 215 of that code" A ehild born before wedlock 
becomes legitimate by the subsequent marriage of its parents." 
Such statute~ "remove the stain and disabilities of bastardy" 
(Goodman v. Goodman, 150 Va. 42, 45 [142 S.E. 412]) not' 
only from children born after the void marriage of their 
parents or before their valid marriage, but also from children 
born, as defendant's child, before the invalid marriage of 
their parents. (Bates v. Meade, 174 Ky. 545 [192 S.W. 666]; 
Goodman v. Goodman, supra; Olinton Oounty Natl. Bk. & Tr. 
00. v. Todhunter, 43 Ohio App. 289 [183 N.E. 88] ; see OarroU 
v. Oarroll, 20 Tex. 731, 732, 746; 84 A.L.R. 499; 6 So.Cal. 
L.Re\'. 338.) [6J The rights of defendant's child include 
any rights that a legitimate child has in a death benefit 
that may be granted to decedent's dependents under the 
Workmen's Compensation Law. (Lab. Code, §§ 4703, 3501.) 
[7] Since the present proceeding will not affect the child's 
status, it follows that the child is not an indispensable party. 
(See Bank of Oalifornia v. Superior Oourt, 16 Ca1.2d 516, I 
521 [106 P.2d 879].) I 
[8] Defendant's right to share in a death benefit under 
the Workmen's Compensation Law does not depend on the' '. 
validity of her marriage. Defendant will be entitled to com-
pensation should the Industrial Accident Commission deter-: 
mine that she was dependent for her support upon decedent 
and in good faith lived in his household as his wife. (Mac- ' 
Arthur v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 220 Cal. 142 [29 P.2d 846];; 
Harlan v. Indust"ial Ace. Oom., 194 Cal. 352, 364 [228 P.', 
654]; Moore Shipbuilding Oorp. v. Industrial Ace. Oom.,·: 
185 Cal. 200, 205 [196 P. 257, 13 A.L.R. 676] ; Temescal Rock' 
00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 180 Cal. 637 [182 P. 447, 13, 
A.L.R. 683); DeFreece v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 26 CaI.App.~ 
2d 584, 587 [80 P.2d 129]; Louden v. Industrial Ace. Oom., i 
) 
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105 Cal.App. 65, 69 l286 P. 10i,5J.) "The dependency of 
the claimant is the true basis of his right to recover compensa-
tion rather than blood or marriage. Relationship is really 
only evidence of depengency." (Harlan v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., supra, at p. 364.) Similarly, in passing upon any claim 
that plaintiff may mlke for compensation and in detennining 
under sectioll 4704 of the Labor Code whether to assign any 
part of its award to any on~ or more of the dependents in 
accordance with their respecttve needs, the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission may consider the fact that plaintiff lived 
separately from her husband and was not supported by him 
for a period exceeding twelve years. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
